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Abstract 
 
Controversy surrounds the question of whether the experience sometimes elicited by 
visual stimuli in blindsight (type-2 blindsight) is visual in nature or whether it is some 
sort of non-visual experience. The suggestion that the experience is visual seems, at 
face value, to make sense. I argue here, however, that the residual abilities found in 
type-1 blindsight (blindsight in which stimuli elicit no conscious experience) are not 
aspects of normal vision with consciousness deleted, but are based fragments of visual 
processes that, in themselves, would not be intelligible as visual experiences. If type-2 
blindsight is a conscious manifestation of this residual function then it is not obvious 
that type-2 blindsight would be phenomenally like vision. 
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 1. Introduction. 
 
Blindsight was originally characterised as “visual capacity remaining after damage to  
striate cortex…” “even though the patient had no awareness of  ‘seeing’ in blind 
portion of his field” (Weiskrantz, et al, 1974). It was subsequently discovered that 
patients with blindsight did, under some circumstances, report some kind of 
experience associated with stimuli presented in their regions of blindness. This is now 
known as type-2 blindsight (e.g. Weiskrantz, 1997). The nature of type-2 blindsight 
has been controversial to say the least. If the experience reported in type-2 blindsight 
is like that of normal vision (something that Weiskrantz doubts) then this implies that 
conscious visual experience can be elicited in the absence of primary visual cortex 
(see e.g. ffytche & Zeki, 2011). The positive reports of experience associated with 
visual stimuli in type-2 blindsight need not, however, be like normal visual 
experiences. In experiments exploring type-2 blindsight the subject is typically asked 
to make decision about some property of a visual stimulus followed by a 
‘commentary’ response indicating whether he or she had any awareness associated 
that stimulus. A positive response in this context might simply indicate ‘feeling of 
knowing’ – that is, a sense that the preceding discrimination decision was something 
other than a guess. Some phenomenal experience beyond a feeling of knowing may, 
however, also occur. In this paper will concentrate on the nature of any such 
phenomenal experience that may occur in type-2 blindsight. 
 
One approach to answering this question is simply to assert that any phenomenal 
experience elicited by a visual stimulus will be, by definition, a visual experience. 
Others argue that this is not necessarily the case. A recent exchange of papers by 
Morten Overgaard (e.g. Overgaard & Grünbaum, 2011) and Berit Brogaard (e.g. 
Brogaard, 2011) explored these issues in depth. The possibility that a given type of 
experience may have multiple causes has been known since Muller coined his Law of 
Specific Nerve Energies in 1835. It is less clear whether a given cause, in this case a 
visual stimulus, can give rise to different types of experience. As Overgaard is at 
pains to point out, it is dangerous to reply on introspection. The degree to which 
blindsight report awareness and the ways in which they describe this awareness 
appear to be highly variable (see e.g. Zeki & ffytche, 1998) and may be influenced by 
their interpretations of their own condition and of the experimenter’s expectations. It 
is also important to distinguish between patients who display blindsight and those 
who simply have severely impaired normal vision where stimuli that would be clearly 
seen by normal observers are, instead, near the threshold of vision. Azzopardi and 
Cowey (1997) used a signal detection theoretic approach to demonstrate that 
blindsight (specifically type-1 blindsight) was qualitatively distinct from near-
threshold vision. If we accept these two concerns we might ask what we can learn by 
studying the abilities, rather than subjective reports, of patients who clearly display 
type-1 blindsight. 
 
The case I want to make is that the residual visual abilities of blindsight patients are 
so different from normal vision that it is hard to imagine what it is like to experience 
them. I will argue that ways in which blindsight subjects succeed in colour 
discrimination, shape discrimination, motion discrimination or luminance 
discrimination tasks bears little resemblance to those that would be used in normal 
vision. If blindsight subjects have experiences elicited by visual stimuli we can only 
call these experiences ‘vision’ by asserting that they are by definition vision, not 
because they are like visual experience. 
 
2. Colour and brightness. 
 
In 1999 Morland published a paper reporting experiments that explicitly tested 
whether the effects of visual stimuli presented in the blind field of blindsight patient 
GY were comparable with his experiences of the same stimuli in his sighted field 
Morland et al, 1999). In one set of experiments GY was asked to adjust a stimulus 
presented in his blind field so that it matched a stimulus presented in his good field. 
Separate tests were made of his ability to adjust the luminance, colour (wavelength of 
light) and speed of motion of stimuli so that they matched between blind and seeing 
fields. GY was able to match both wavelength and speed between left (sighted for 
GY) and right (blind for GY) hemifields with almost the same accuracy as a normal 
observer. Although GY could match the luminance of a pair of stimuli both presented 
in his blind visual field, he was unable to match luminance between stimuli presented 
in the blind and sighted hemifields. Morland concludes “the luminance-modulated 
percept derived from the hemianopic field is not mapped to a perceptual dimension 
that can be compared with normal brightness perception. The two percepts seem to be 
unrelated and uncoupled” (p.1189). Should we conclude that, even if GY’s residual 
blind-field brightness processing is not like his normal brightness perception, 
nevertheless his residual motion and colour processing is like normal vision?  
 
Morland includes some of GY’s introspections about the manner in which he 
conducted the wavelength matching experiment. GY says “I make the stimulus 
neither too red nor too green compared to the stimulus in the normal field” (p. 1189) 
but when asked if his blind-field percepts were “the same as normal red or green. He 
responded by saying ‘Nothing is the same; I just know I can do this match’” (p. 1190). 
So, even though he succeeds at the matching task his introspection suggests that he is 
not comparing the same kind of experiences.    
 
Morland was asking GY to compare the wavelengths of lights presented in his blind 
and sighted fields. When we perceive colour normally, however, our experience 
depends upon much more than the wavelength of light reaching our eyes. When we 
perceive the colours of objects our percept is of a property of those objects in the 
world not a percept of the wavelength distribution of light reaching our retina. In 
perceiving colour the visual system estimates the efficiency with which a material 
reflects lights of different wavelengths. Roughly speaking a good reflector of long 
wavelength light looks red whilst a good reflector of short wavelength light looks blue. 
The spectrum of light that reaches our eyes from an object is not, however, solely 
determined by the reflectance properties of the object, it is also dependent on the 
wavelength composition of the light illuminating the object. The visual system takes 
account of variations in the spectral composition of lights illuminating objects so that 
their perceived colour remains relatively unaffected by changes in illumination – the 
process of colour constancy (see e.g. Smithson, 2005). Colour constancy allows us to 
judge whether two objects seen under different illuminants are made of the same 
material. It is important to realise, however, that colour constancy not only provides 
us with this cognitive ability but that it also affects our experience of colour. This is 
beautifully illustrated in some visual illusions prepared by Dale Purves and Beau 
Lotto (Purves & Lotto, 2003). We see what appears to be a pair of multi-coloured 
Rubik’s cubes, one viewed through yellow cellophane and one view through blue 
cellophane. Some blue tiles and some yellow tiles can clearly be seen on both. What 
is remarkable is that the blue tiles on the cube seen through the yellow filter and the 
yellow tiles seen through the blue filter project identical lights to our eyes yet the 
colours we experience when looking at them are quite different (blue and yellow). 
Our experiences of these blue and yellow colours do not change even when we know 
that the lights reaching our eyes from the two tiles are identical.  
 
The anatomy of colour vision shows a clear progression from ganglion cells in the 
retina where neural responses are determined primarily by the wavelength 
composition of light, through striate cortex where cells responding to wavelength 
contrast are found and extrastriate areas that appear to compute colour constancy. 
Cerebral achromatopsics, that is, patients with cortical colour blindness, lack these 
later extrastriate colour areas, do not experience colour and cannot make covert colour 
discriminations (Heywood, Kentridge & Cowey, 1998a). These patients do, however, 
see the borders between regions of different colour (Heywood, Kentridge & Cowey, 
1998b) and make decision about the similarity of stimuli based on the chromatic 
contrasts they make with their backgrounds rather than their surface colour (Kentridge, 
Heywood & Cowey, 2004). We subsequently showed that the blindsight patient DB, 
with damage to striate cortex, does not even respond on the basis of chromatic 
contrast, instead he simply makes matches on the basis of the wavelengths of light 
reflected by the patches being compared (Kentridge, Heywood & Weiskrantz, 2007). 
Purely chromatic stimuli that we, or even a cerebral achromatopsic, would judge as 
being similar are judged as being different by a blindsight patient. So, although 
blindsight patients can make judgments about the wavelength composition of light 
they do not go on to process this information in a manner that might yield a normal 
colour experience. They are even further removed from doing so than a cortically 
colour blind patient. 
 
3. Motion 
 
What of motion perception? In Morland’s experiments GY performed extremely well 
when matching the speed of motion between stimuli in his sighted and blind visual 
fields. This does not, however, imply that he extracts information about motion from a 
stimulus in the same fashion as a normal observer. One might, for example, infer that 
an object has moved by noting its location at one time, wait with one’s eyes shut, 
open them and note the object’s position again, and finally compare the two positions. 
If the positions differ then one can infer that the object has moved without seeing any 
motion. It is easy to see that one could additionally make inferences about the speed 
and direction of motion without seeing any motion.  This is, of course, not the normal 
way of seeing motion. Azzopardi & Cowey (2001) explored the mechanisms through 
which blindsight subjects extract information about motion using stimuli known as 
random dot kinematograms. A random dot kinematogram stimulus typically consists 
of a large number of randomly position dots all of which move. The dots may all 
move in different directions but, on average, there is a predominant direction of 
motion. In addition, each dot only moves a small distance before disappearing and 
being replaced by another dot at a different random location. It is not possible to judge 
the overall direction of motion by tracking changes in the position of any individual 
dot; indeed, it is hard to even do this, given the short lifetime of individual dots. 
Normal observers effortlessly see the direction and speed of motion in random dot 
kinematograms. Blindsight patients fail entirely. If the elements of the random dot 
kinematogram initially change in contrast whilst remaining stationary before the onset 
of motion then blindsight patients cannot even determine when motion starts, let alone 
discriminate its speed or direction. Recently Azzopardi and Hock (2011) showed that 
the responses of blindsight patients to motion are influenced by changes in the 
contrast polarity of stimuli. If we see a black bar against a grey background extend 
upwards we see motion in an upward direction whether the extension to the bar is 
black or white. A blindsight patient reports downward motion when the upward 
extension is white. This pattern of performance is consistent with a response to 
motion energy rather than to changes in the location of a feature of an object over 
time. Normal subjects’ perception of motion in random dot kinematograms is thought 
to rely on motion energy cues. So blindsight subjects may possess functioning motion 
energy detectors, but it appears that they are not always able to apply them when they 
might be useful and do apply them to in situations where normal observers would not. 
There are, then, situations where normal observers see motion but where blindsight 
patients cannot see the onset of motion, cannot discriminate the speed or direction of 
motion or even judge the motion to be in the opposite direction of that seen by the 
normal visual system. Some of the multiple mechanisms we use in motion perception 
may survive in blindsight but they are not deployed in the same manner as they are in 
normal motion vision. 
 
4. Shape. 
 
Morland did not test GY’s ability to compare characteristics of the spatial structure of 
stimuli between visual fields. There are, however, telling results reported in 
Weiskrantz’s 1986 monograph on blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986). Blindsight patients 
had been shown to be able to discriminate both the orientation of lines (horizontal vs. 
vertical) and even shape such as ‘X’ and ‘O’ in the earliest reports of the phenomenon 
(Weiskrantz et al, 1974). In the later monograph Weiskrantz reports, however, that, 
despite being able to discriminate ‘X’ from ‘O’, patient DB could not discriminate 
equilateral triangles with their apex pointing upwards (e.g. ∆) from those with the 
apex pointing downwards. The ability to discriminate ‘X’ from ‘O’ might tempt one 
to infer that blindsight subjects can discriminate shape, the latter result with triangles 
shows that this is not the case. Notice that equilateral triangle with the apices pointing 
upwards or downwards are constructed from exactly the same set of lines. Blindsight 
subjects might be able to discriminate orientation or curvature but they do not appear 
to be able to extract the relationships between the components of stimuli and combine 
these into representations of shape. Again, what might appear to be a residual ability 
that is like normal vision is nothing of the sort. We may ask ourselves what it would 
be like to see the orientation and curvature of features in a scene but not to see the 
objects to which these features belong. For me, at least, this is not something I can 
imagine.   
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
Type-1 blindsight is, then, not normal vision with the consciousness deleted. It is not 
even fragments of normal vision with the consciousness deleted. Blindsight patients 
clearly have many residual abilities, but none of these are complete aspects of normal 
vision. If type-2 blindsight is a conscious manifestation of these residual visual 
functions the experience elicited by visual stimuli is likely to be visually unintelligible.  
 The profound differences between residual visual abilities in blindsight and normal 
vision may well explain why, if these residual functions are the basis of type-2 
blindsight, patients are unwilling to describe experiences elicited by visual stimuli as 
being visual experiences. They would be unlike vision in the sense that they would 
not be consistent with experiences elicited by the same stimuli in normal vision. Can a 
case nevertheless still be made for claiming that these experiences are visual? One 
might argue that as the neural responses to visual stimuli still occur within the visual 
system of blindsight patients then any associated experiences will be visual in nature. 
Even this argument is not watertight. In a series of remarkable studies Sur (see e.g. 
von Melchner et al, 2000) showed that if axons from one eye of a ferret are redirected 
so that visual signals are sent to auditory cortex then the ferret still classifies signals 
detected by that eye as visual despite the fact that the neural responses elicited occur 
in auditory cortex. The cortical area within which a neural response occurs need not 
necessarily determine the modality of associated experience. Of course in these 
experiments the surgery for re-wiring of connections was performed when the ferrets 
were one day old and so the internal organisation of auditory cortex may have been 
modified during development. 
 
I would conclude that the case for assuming experience in type-2 blindsight is like 
vision is weak. It is all too easy to interpret type-1 blindsight as vision with the 
consciousness deleted but we now know that the successes of blindsight patients in a 
variety of visual discrimination tasks are not evidence for the survival of normal 
visual abilities. We cannot know directly what the experiences of blindsight patients 
in type-2 mode are like. It may be the case that their experience is like vision but they 
say that it is not. To draw the inference that experience in type-2 blindsight is visual 
despite patients’ denial requires a much stronger argument than the assertion that 
experiences elicited by visual stimuli are necessarily visual. 
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